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FAILING EXPECTATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE IN THE ERA OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE 
Olivier Sylvain

 
INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs are eagerly developing techniques to monetize 
the massive amount of data that course through the networked 
information economy every day.  Major telecommunications 
companies and Internet companies in particular are designing 
services and applications that lure users into volunteering as much 
personal information as possible.  These firms use data to market 
services or trade with third parties. 
Users, meanwhile, are of two minds about these data-sharing 
arrangements.  On the one hand, polls suggest that users have 
serious concerns.1  On the other hand, the sheer pace of growth of 
the consumer market for networked services and devices strongly 
suggests that they are comfortable enough to share personal 
information about their identities, locations, and preferences.  Users 
do not appear to be deterred by shifting privacy policies and long-
worded terms of service that detail how much of their information 
will be traded.2  To the contrary, if consumer demand is any 
measure of interest, users appear to welcome innovations that track 
 
  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful 
to the Wake Forest Law Review for hosting the symposium on digital privacy.  I 
also am indebted to Danielle Citron, Susan Freiwald, Sonia Katyal, Andrew 
Kent, Christopher Hoofnagle, Olatunde Johnson, Joel Reidenberg, Neil 
Richards, Zephyr Teachout, and Alexander Tsesis for helpful comments about 
this Essay.  All remaining errors are mine. 
 1. See Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW 
RES. INTERNET PROJECT 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2013/PIP_AnonymityOnline_090513.pdf (“Most internet users would 
like to be anonymous online at least occasionally, but many think it is not 
possible to be completely anonymous online.”); see also Jan Lauren Boyles et al., 
Privacy and Data Management on Mobile Devices, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT 
2 (Sept. 5, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP 
_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf (“More than half of app users have uninstalled 
or decided to not install an app due to concerns about personal information.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change Is 
Subject of F.T.C. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, at B1; Claire Cain Miller 
& Vindu Goel, Google to Sell Users’ Endorsements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at 
B1. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2473101 
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and even predict their tastes for new products and services.3  Users 
appear to expect that their personal data is the proverbial grist for 
today’s networked information economy. 
In this way, the networked information economy has done 
wonders for government surveillance as well.  It is no longer a secret 
today that federal, state, and local officials use the massive stores of 
available data to paint a “mosaic” of users’ past and current 
behaviors.4  This potential for total government surveillance has 
opened the door to a whole new era that is evocative of the dystopic 
portrayals in popular books and films like 1984 and Minority Report.  
Every moment that a user is connected to the network has become 
an opportunity to be surveilled by law enforcement and national 
security agencies.5  The sense of being watched all the time could 
chill users’ willingness to speak their minds and associate with 
others in ways that are evocative of totalitarianism. 
In this way, the large-scale law enforcement practice of 
collecting and sorting data is just one aspect of the “total 
surveillance” characteristic of the whole networked information 
economy.6  Again, in spite of polls that suggest consumer unease 
about government surveillance, users nevertheless expect to give 
their personal information as the presumptive price to pay for being 
fully connected. 
But there is one important difference.  Commercial behavioral 
tracking and profiling is not held to as high a standard as 
government surveillance.  Governments are limited by the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment; police officials cannot 
search someone without a particularized showing to a court that an 
investigating officer has probable cause to believe that some specific 
criminal activity is afoot.7  In the event law enforcement officials do 
not obtain a warrant, courts make two related inquiries to 
 
 3. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG 
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 
(2013) (describing how trends on social media websites can be used in this way).  
This paradox in consumer expectations is not new.  Users were conflicted in the 
decades before the Court decided Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), on how much they trusted law 
enforcement officials—that is, assuming they even gave state surveillance any 
thought.  See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of 
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2004) (discussing the paradox in 
consumer perceptions about surveillance in the decades before Katz).  This 
confusion remains today.  Id. at 27. 
 4. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, C.I.A. Is Said to Pay AT&T for Call Data, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the C.I.A. paid AT&T for call 
data for surveillance purposes). 
 6. I owe the “total surveillance” term to Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of 
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935–36 (2013). 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
W08_SYLVAIN  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:03 AM 
2014] FAILING EXPECTATIONS 487 
determine whether law enforcement engaged in a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: first, courts ask whether the 
target had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the police 
obtained the materials and, second, courts ask whether this 
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
legitimate.8  This two-step standard has been the foundation of 
federal regulation of law enforcement surveillance since the late 
1960s.9 
To complicate matters, courts have also distinguished between 
government surveillance of communications content on the one hand 
and the monitoring of transactional information about 
communications on the other.10  The first category covers the 
information that parties to a communication explicitly convey to 
each other.  These communications could include, for example, 
conversations about a criminal conspiracy or a terrorist plot.11  
Communications content is direct evidence of specific motivations 
about imminent conduct.12  The second category covers transactional 
information about the communication, including the times, places, 
phone numbers, and addresses.  These data are indispensable 
features of any given communication; service providers must have 
transactional data about senders and addressees in order to 
administer the communication.13 
The distinction between the two—content and transactional 
data—is significant because the warrant requirement does not apply 
to the second.14  Courts have presumed that users consent to the 
public disclosure of transactional data when they volunteer them to 
their service providers.15  The third-party doctrine presumes that, 
 
 8. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 9. See, e.g., Graham B. Smith, Comment, A Constitutional Critique of 
Carnivore, Federal Law Enforcement’s Newest Electronic Surveillance Strategy, 
21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 481, 485 (2001) (describing the federal laws enacted in 
response to the decision in Katz). 
 10. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979); Quon v. Arch 
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on different 
grounds by City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 (explaining how government agents did 
not begin their surveillance of the targets in that case until their investigation 
“had established a strong probability” that the telephone was used for criminal 
purposes); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (discussing how 
eavesdropping uncovered that plaintiff was “a go-between” in a conspiracy to 
issue liquor licenses). 
 12. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 325–27 (1966) (finding 
that the contents of a taped conversation were highly probative in determining 
whether petitioner knowingly attempted to obstruct justice). 
 13. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43. 
 14. Id. at 745–46. 
 15. Id. at 743. 
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when users share it with third-party service providers, they convey 
an expectation that the information is not private.  Users do not 
have that expectation for the content of the communication.16 
This Essay takes up and critiques the contemporary doctrine by 
posing two sets of related questions.  First, what are we to do when 
noncontent information may reveal as much, if not more, intimate 
information about users than the content of communications do?  
That is, what if noncontent data reveal detailed information about 
favorite locations, periodic habits and dealings, and associations?  
Second, should we continue to allow service providers to trade 
noncontent transactional user data with governments without 
restriction when users volunteer those data for the sole purpose of 
obtaining the specific underlying service?  Does it matter that, in the 
aggregate, transactional data expose behavioral patterns that users 
do not fully appreciate about themselves when they volunteer them 
to their service providers? 
I argue here that today’s reasonable expectation test and the 
third-party doctrine have little to nothing to offer by way of privacy 
protection if users today are at least conflicted about whether 
transactional noncontent data should be shared with third parties, 
including law enforcement officials.  This uncertainty about how to 
define public expectation as a descriptive matter, I argue, has 
compelled courts to defer to legislatures to find out what public 
expectation ought to be as a matter of law.  Courts and others 
presume that legislatures are far better than courts at defining 
public expectations about emergent technologies.17  Legislatures, 
courts posit, are designed to receive all manner of evidence about 
public expectations and, subsequently, articulate their findings and 
conclusions in statutes.  Elected officials, after all, must be true to 
their constituents’ desires if they are to stay in office. 
Courts, meanwhile, are by design isolated from electoral 
politics.  It is in this vein that even they seem to agree that there is 
only so much they can say about public expectations of privacy in 
the context of emergent surveillance techniques.18  Courts do not 
have at their disposal any articulated process in Fourth Amendment 
 
 16. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 17. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06, 
855 (2004) (arguing that legislatures, rather than courts, should determine 
search-and-seizure rules when technology is in flux); see also Richards, supra 
note 6, at 1958 (“Professor Orin Kerr is correct when he argues that federal 
statutory law has advantages over the Fourth Amendment in guarding against 
surveillance in the digital age.  Not only is statutory law easier to change, but it 
also can be applied to bind both government and nongovernment actors.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 18. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the legislature may be best suited to deal with privacy 
concerns stemming from new forms of technology). 
W08_SYLVAIN  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2014  11:03 AM 
2014] FAILING EXPECTATIONS 489 
doctrine to discover public expectation as a matter of course.  Public 
expectation is more like a legislative fact, far better suited to 
discovery and deliberation in legislatures.19 
I argue here that the reasonable expectation standard is 
particularly flawed if it has the effect of encouraging judges to seek 
guidance from legislatures on constitutional norms and principles.  
Judicial review is the vital antimajoritarian check against excessive 
government intrusions on individual liberty under our constitutional 
scheme.  This is a responsibility that courts cannot pass off to the 
political branches when, as is the case today, most people expect 
that the cost of network connection is total surveillance. 
Court-administered privacy law doctrine accordingly must 
change if the protection against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” is to have any positive legal meaning.  The current court-
created doctrine will not be able to keep up if it compels judges to 
measure public expectation.  It is time for courts to reassert their 
positive duty to say what privacy law is. 
I.  TOTAL SURVEILLANCE 
A. The New Normal 
The vast majority of people in the United States today take 
affirmative steps to keep their online behavior private.20  Most, 
however, also believe that these efforts only go so far.21  They expect 
that, no matter their efforts, most of what they do online can be 
discovered.22 
Indeed, despite their misgivings, participation and upload rates 
at the top social networking sites and applications continue to grow.  
For example, over 1.2 billion users log in to their Facebook accounts 
at least every month.23  That is around one-third greater than the 
number of user accounts Facebook had just a year before.24  Of 
these, about 700 million are active daily users.25  These users upload 
an average of more than 350 million photos every day, with a huge 
fraction of these pictures coming from smartphone cameras.26  
Meanwhile, about 500 million people have active Twitter accounts 
 
 19. Id. at 964. 
 20. See Rainie et al., supra note 1; see also Boyles et al., supra note 1. 
 21. See Rainie et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“Most do not think it is possible to 
be completely anonymous online, though a healthy minority believe they can be 
totally hidden.”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 24 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
 24. See Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Oct. 24, 2012) 
(reporting the monthly active users at 1.01 billion as of Sept. 30, 2012). 
 25. See Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 23 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
 26. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 1, 2013); see also 
Always Connected: How Smartphones and Social Keep Us Engaged, IDC 6–7 
(2013), https://fb-public.app.box.com/s/3iq5x6uwnqtq7ki4q8wk. 
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from which they post nearly fifty-eight million tweets and photos 
every day.27  If these popular Internet-based applications are any 
indication of how willing users are to publicize their personal 
information, we can assume that, no matter how uneasy they may 
be about disclosing so much,28 users are still willing to do it. 
Facebook, Twitter, and most other Internet companies generally 
do not have misgivings about collecting users’ personal information.  
To the contrary, they see personal user data as the currency of the 
networked information economy.29  For them, it is to be “reused, 
repurposed and sold to other companies” for secondary uses that no 
one really anticipated when the data were first collected.30  As we 
speak, these firms are developing creative new techniques for 
tracking users’ online behavior.31 
B. Collection, Aggregation, and Sharing 
In short, user tracking involves the collection, storage, and 
analysis of user data.32  Sites and applications administer user 
information in this way in order to provide a specific, ostensibly 
user-friendly service.33  Consider Amazon, Zappos, or any retail 
website which, upon a user search, lists the items sought by a user 
but also makes recommendations about other items that might 
interest the user.  Collection and analysis in this case is 
 
 27. Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (Oct. 3, 2013) 
(reporting the monthly active users as 215 million, and 500 million tweets per 
day as of October 3, 2013). 
 28. See Internet Freedom Group Splits from Tech Companies over 
Surveillance Concerns, HILL (Oct. 10, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hil
licon-valley/technology/327831-internet-freedom-group-splits-from-tech-
companies-over-surveillance-concerns. 
 29. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, Selling Secrets of 
Phone Users to Advertisers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 1 (discussing how 
companies like Google and Facebook are trying to find new ways to monetize 
their user bases by finding way to target them with specific ads); Danny 
Yadron, Private-Data Firms Draw Fire of FTC, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2013, at B2 
(reporting on how tech companies selling personal data might violate federal 
privacy law). 
 30. Michiko Kakutani, Watched by the Web: Surveillance Is Reborn, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2013, at C1 (reviewing Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth 
Cukier’s book, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, 
WORK, AND THINK (2013)). 
 31. See, e.g., Several Top Websites Use Device Fingerprinting to Secretly 
Track Users, PHYS.ORG (Oct. 10, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-10-websites-
device-fingerprinting-secretly-track.html; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How to 
Prevent Device Fingerprinting, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2010, 11:32 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/11/30/how-to-prevent-device-fingerprinting/. 
 32. See, e.g., Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2013), 
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (discussing how Facebook 
tracks, stores, and uses user data). 
 33. Id. 
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contemporaneous and generally incidental to providing the services 
or products for which users sign up or log in. 
Service providers, sites, and applications also hold the data for 
business-related purposes related to the underlying service or for 
use at some future date for some presently unknown future 
purpose.34  For example, a department store might use data about a 
user’s purchases of a specific line of men’s clothing to market a novel 
new male antiperspirant.  Or, more pertinently, it might sell or 
trade that information to another company with an interest in 
knowing who is buying a certain kind of product. 
As intrusive as total surveillance is, most users seem resigned 
to the fact that service providers and online applications share their 
personal information with third-party data aggregators.35  These 
aggregators—social networking sites and Internet search 
companies, as well as large credit agencies and commercial data 
brokers—hold extraordinary amounts of information about users.36  
With so much data comes the awesome power to define users based 
on disparate bits of information.  Data holders can be a user’s most 
trusted guide in a foreign country.  But they might also use the 
information to guide you to more expensive products or even to 
destroy your reputation and economic well-being.37 
These firms, meanwhile, assume that the benefits of large-scale 
data aggregation and sorting far exceed any of the disadvantages.  
Google and Facebook have developed algorithms that analyze the 
finest details of users’ online behavior and send targeted 
advertisements to those users based on that information.38  Users do 
 
 34. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  See 
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy 
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1323–24 (2000) (discussing how 
aggregating and analyzing user data stored at “data warehouses” can reveal 
patterns in user behavior). 
 35. See, e.g., Hadley Malcolm, Millennials Don’t Worry About Online 
Privacy, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/m
oney/business/2013/04/21/millennials-personal-info-online/2087989/ (discussing 
the millennial generation’s willingness to post personal information about 
themselves on the Internet). 
 36. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Aga of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013). 
 37. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1258 (2008); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to 
the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1760 (2010) 
(discussing “database[s] of ruin”); see also Ryan Calo, Digital Market 
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 29), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309703##. 
 38. See Katja de Vries, Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: 
A Parable and a First Analysis, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE 
COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
TECHNOLOGY 44, 52  (Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013) 
(discussing “machine learning”). 
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not seem particularly bothered by disclosures because they continue 
to acquire applications that know or predict their tastes before they 
even know what they want.39 
C. Paradoxes in Expectation 
Private companies are not the only entities that trade and share 
users’ personal online information.  Governments, too, are in the 
business of collecting and analyzing personal data, and sometimes 
purchasing them.40  Their reasons, however, are different.  Federal, 
state, and local agencies generally rely on the interests in national 
security, law enforcement, and public safety.  Emergent surveillance 
technologies are perfectly suited to achieving these public ends.41  
Properly designed algorithms can help to search online data for 
possible wrongdoing and even anticipate lawlessness.42 
What has emerged, then, is a government-industry partnership 
that, on the one hand, counts on users’ demonstrable willingness to 
share personal information with data brokers and, on the other 
hand, furthers the government interest in public safety.43  This is 
not a devious plan that was hatched in some dark, shadowy office on 
Capitol Hill or at Fort Meade, although it sometimes feels that 
way.44  The Internet’s early designers and proponents did not have 
total surveillance in mind.  To the contrary, the early designers 
sought to avert centralized control, placing the intelligence of the 
network at the “ends” with users. 
The Internet changed quite dramatically after Congress 
formally commercialized it in the mid-1990s.45  Indeed, since then, 
total surveillance has become its defining characteristic.  Today, the 
most popular service providers, sites, and applications have 
 
 39. See generally ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE (2011) (discussing the 
dangers of this new era of personalization); Claire Cain Miller, New Apps Know 
the Answer Before You Ask the Question, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at A1. 
 40. See Craig Timberg & Barton Gellman, NSA Pays Firms Large Sums for 
Network Access, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, at A1. 
 41. See Citron, supra note 37, at 1252–53. 
 42. See Martijn van Otterlo, A Machine Learning View on Profiling, in 
PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 38, 103, 103–07. 
 43. See Bruce Schneier, The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership, 
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-31/the-
public-private-surveillance-partnership.html. 
 44. See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room, WIRED 
(Apr. 7, 2006), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70619 
(discussing secretive Bush-era eavesdropping). 
 45. See Internet History, CONNECTED: INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Topics/57.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(discussing the commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s). 
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designed sophisticated techniques for aggregating and sharing as 
much data about each and every visitor as legally possible.46 
And users have been complicit at every step, divulging all 
manners of information in order to receive the full benefits of the 
networked information economy.  They volunteer their personal 
information to service providers and application developers and, 
whether they know it or not, allow those companies to monitor and 
trade this information with third parties.47 
But users today are generally undecided about total 
surveillance when government agencies are involved.  They want it 
both ways.  On the one hand, they volunteer personal information to 
service providers and application developers.48  Yet, users are also 
wary of sharing too much, especially when the government is 
involved.49  They would like to be anonymous online, sometimes 
even as they also recognize that complete anonymity is impossible.50 
This is the contemporary paradox of total surveillance today; 
people aspire to control what governments know about them, but 
they also believe that public exposure is inevitable, and perhaps 
even necessary, in a fully interconnected world. 
II.  EXPECTATION IN AN AGE OF TOTAL SURVEILLANCE 
A. Reasonable Expectation 
Total surveillance in liberal democracies substantially 
transforms the relationship between individuals and their 
government.51  The “panoptic gaze” of constant government 
surveillance is arguably the most dangerous threat to personhood 
and citizenship.  Total government surveillance in particular has 
 
 46. See Several Top Websites Use Device Fingerprinting to Secretly Track 
Users, supra note 31; Valentino-DeVries, supra note 31. 
 47. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 36; see also Rainie et al., supra note 
1. 
 48. See Malcolm, supra note 35 (discussing this trend in the context of the 
Millennial generation). 
 49. See Jon Cohen & Dan Balz, Poll: Privacy Concerns Rise After NSA 
Leaks, WASH. POST (July 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2013-07-23/politics/40862490_1_edward-snowden-nsa-programs-privacy 
(discussing how users were wary of information being shared in the wake of 
early NSA leaks by Edward Snowden). 
 50. See Rainie et al., supra note 1. 
 51. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (discussing the effects total surveillance has on society); see also 
Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information 
Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 337 n.42 (2013) (citing Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2011)) (“The capacity of technology to find 
and publish personal information, including records required by the 
government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal 
privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”). 
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significant implications for the rights to speech, association, and 
“intellectual privacy.”52 
Since the late 1960s, the courts have assessed the 
constitutionality of government searches by asking whether the 
defendant “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” at 
the time of the search, and whether that “expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”53  Specifically, 
courts ask the two questions posed by Justice John Marshall Harlan 
in Katz v. United States: first, whether the defendant had a 
subjective expectation of privacy at the time of the search and, 
second, whether society generally shares that expectation.54 
In Katz, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a 
warrantless police wiretap of a public telephone in an enclosed glass 
booth.55  The majority determined that the police violated the 
Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.56  In an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court 
resolved that the Fourth Amendment is addressed to “people, not 
places.”57  When the defendant closed the door of the booth to make 
his call, the Court reasoned, he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the call.58  This was particularly true in the context of the 
telephone, a communications technology that had come to occupy a 
“vital role” in society.59 
Justice Harlan departed from the majority opinion to make 
plain that the property-based approach was inadequate to address 
nontrespassory government surveillance.60  In an earlier line of 
cases, the Court had allowed government wiretaps of telephone 
conversations because the interception occurred outside of the 
defendant’s private property.61  The Fourth Amendment, however, 
was not solely addressed when addressing physical intrusions by a 
tangible object, Justice Harlan explained.62  Such an approach “in 
 
 52. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387–389 
(2008); see also Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 
689, 691, 693 (2013). 
 53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–55; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 
(2000). 
 54. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 350 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 359. 
 57. Id. at 351.  In Berger, decided six months before Katz, the Court hinted 
that a property-based approach to privacy was insufficient when analyzing 
nontrespassory surveillance.  See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45–49 
(1967).  In Katz, the Court overturned such an approach.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 
359. 
 58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 59. Id. at 352. 
 60. Id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 362. 
 62. Id. 
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the present day,” he continued, is “bad physics as well as bad law” 
since “reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by 
electronic as well as physical invasion.”63 
In the end, the majority opinion and Justice Harlan’s important 
elaboration caused “a profound shift in Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”64  Courts have since relied on Harlan’s concurrence in 
particular to review a wide range of cases involving government 
surveillance and a wide range of technologies, including overhead 
flights, thermal imaging devices, drug-sniffing dogs, and GPS 
tracking.65 
B. Trespass 
As foundational as it is to the analysis of law enforcement 
surveillance techniques today, the reasonable expectation standard 
does not exclusively determine whether government surveillance 
amounts to a search under the Fourth Amendment.66  The property-
based approach has retained a place in the doctrine.  Through a 
series of relatively recent opinions authored by Justice Antonin 
Scalia, the Court has relied on the explicit enumeration of tangible 
property in the text of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects”) to identify a property-based conception 
of privacy.67 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in United States v. 
Jones is the most recent articulation of this approach.68  At issue in 
that case was the constitutionality of a police department’s 
surreptitious tracking of a defendant’s vehicle over the course of four 
weeks.69  The Court held that attaching the GPS device and using it 
to track the defendant for a long period—well past the time allowed 
in the original warrant—constituted an unconstitutional search.70  
Writing for five members of the majority, Justice Scalia explained 
that the Fourth Amendment protection against searches is tied to 
 
 63. Id.  The Fourth Amendment, Justice Harlan would elaborate four years 
later, required a far more searching inquiry into the relative risks of the search 
to citizenship in the contemporary context.  United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 64. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s 
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 750 (2005). 
 65. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–17 (2013); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2000); see also United States v. Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 66. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment 
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”). 
 67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32–33; see also Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414; Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 68. Jones,132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 69. Id. at 948. 
 70. Id. at 948–49. 
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common-law trespass.71  The police officers, he concluded, intruded 
on the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they attached 
and used the tracking device.72 
Justice Scalia’s Jones opinion is not the first time he has 
asserted that the trespass rule is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment right.  Kyllo involved a thermal-imaging device that 
police used on a public street to measure heat emanating from 
inside a home.73  (High temperatures suggest that the inhabitant 
has an indoor greenhouse or, more specifically, is growing 
marijuana.)  Justice Scalia explained on behalf of the majority that 
privacy in the home was the “minimum expectation” under the 
Fourth Amendment.74  The home, he continued, has long been 
recognized by society as “a constitutionally protected area.”75  In 
Florida v. Jardines,76 a much more recent case involving the use of 
drug-sniffing dogs just outside of a home, Justice Scalia, again 
writing for the Court, observed that private homes are where 
“privacy expectations are most heightened.”77  The home, he wrote, 
“is first among equals” in Fourth Amendment analysis.78 
C. Nontrespassory Surveillance 
In concurring opinions, Justices Sotomayor and Alito agreed 
with the majority’s decision in Jones.79  But their opinions help 
clarify the scope of the current doctrine as it relates to total 
surveillance. 
Justice Sotomayor agreed that the trespass rule represented “an 
irreducible constitutional minimum” of constitutional protection.80  
She, however, also would have held that an unreasonable search 
occurs whenever the government collects “a substantial quantum of 
intimate information about any person whom . . . in its unfettered 
discretion, [it] chooses to track.”81  The trespass rule alone, she 
explained, has very little applicability today, in the era of total 
surveillance.82  The government’s “unrestrained power to assemble 
 
 71. Id. at 950 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34); see also United States v. Perea-
Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has explained 
that the role of reasonable expectation analysis in evaluating the 
constitutionality of searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of 
the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion.”). 
 72. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 73. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. 
 74. Id. at 34. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 77. Id. at 1414–15 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)). 
 78. Id. at 1414. 
 79. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); 
id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 956. 
 82. Id. at 955. 
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data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse” 
and “chills associational and expressive freedoms.”83  She wrote her 
opinion to affirm that the Katz test only “augmented” Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and “did not displace or diminish, the common-
law trespassory test,” which, she argued, was sufficient to resolve 
the dispute before the Court.84 
Justice Alito, in contrast, was sharply critical of the trespass 
rule.  He too would have determined that the GPS-tracking 
technique at issue was unreasonable, but, unlike the majority, he 
would have asked whether the technique “involved a degree of 
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”85  
Wherever the line between reasonable and unreasonable lies, he 
concluded, surveillance over the course of four weeks is undoubtedly 
unreasonable.86 
What is more, Justice Alito continued, the trespass rule on 
which Justice Scalia relied was inadequate to assess emergent 
nontrespassory surveillance techniques like the continuous four-
week GPS tracking at issue in the case.87  The majority, Justice 
Alito continued, seemed to be drawing on a discredited pre-Katz line 
of cases in which nontrespassory surveillance of electronic 
communications was not considered a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.88  The trespass rule, he explained, fails to address 
persistent unwanted nonphysical surveillance.89  And worse, he 
continued, the rule would lead to incongruous results where, for 
example, attaching an electronic tracking device to a vehicle is 
forbidden while persistent nontrespassory physical surveillance of 
the defendant’s movements on public roads is not.90  In short, 
Justice Alito concluded, the trespass rule of privacy is beside the 
point in an era of total nontrespassory surveillance.91 
Justice Scalia answered Justice Alito’s concurrence by 
recognizing that trespass is not “the exclusive test” under the 
Fourth Amendment.92  “Situations involving merely the 
 
 83. Id. at 956. 
 84. Id. at 955. 
 85. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 958, 964 (distinguishing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983), and holding that the use of surreptitiously planted beeper to monitor 
vehicle’s movements on public roads was not a search). 
 87. Id. at 958 (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted 
himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order 
to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?” (internal citation omitted)); cf. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] 
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”). 
 88. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and other cases). 
 89. Id. at 962. 
 90. Id. at 961. 
 91. See id. at 959–61. 
 92. Id. at 953 (majority opinion). 
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transmission of electronic signals without trespass,” he explained, 
“would remain subject to Katz analysis.”93  However, “Jones’s Fourth 
Amendment rights,” he observed, “do not rise or fall with the Katz 
formulation.”94  The Court is not required to employ the reasonable 
expectation test under the Fourth Amendment.95  Nor, he explained, 
is the Katz analysis necessary to resolve the specific dispute before 
the Court.96  Justice Alito’s hypothetical scenario of persistent 
nontrespassory physical surveillance on public roads, he asserted, 
would have to be addressed if that case comes before the Court.97  
Rather, Justice Scalia concluded, the core traditional constitutional 
interest in protecting physical intrusions on tangible property is 
sufficient to invalidate the police’s technique.98 
Despite Justice Scalia’s efforts, however, five members of the 
current Court now would recognize that persistent warrantless long-
term surveillance like the one at issue in Jones is an unreasonable 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, irrespective 
of whether government officials committed a trespass.99  Speaking 
for this shadow majority, Justices Sotomayor and Alito both 
explained that dramatic improvements in location-tracking 
technology have supplied law enforcement officials with the capacity 
to generate an astonishingly accurate profile of individuals based on 
the mosaic of information available.100  This broad capacity imperils 
the traditional relationship between the government and its citizens 
and unsettles the continuing pertinence of the current doctrine. 
State courts have now had some time to apply and to elaborate 
on the rule in Jones to cases involving GPS tracking.101  In a 
 
 93. Id.; see also id. at 950–51 (discussing Alderman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 165, 176 (1969)). 
 94. Id. at 950. 
 95. Id. at 950–51. 
 96. Id. at 954; cf. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) 
(explaining that a Katz analysis is not always necessary in these Fourth 
Amendment cases). 
 97. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953–54. 
 98. Id. at 952. 
 99. See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 100. Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  This reasoning echoes the “mosaic theory” on which the D.C. 
Circuit below based its decision for defendants.  United States v. Maynard, 615 
F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  According to the panel below, the 
government conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if 
the information that it aggregates over a certain period of time about an 
individual reveals facts that would otherwise have been private—that is, the 
information could not have been generated by human surveillance alone.  Id. at 
563–65. 
 101. See State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123, 1132–34 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010) 
(applying Delaware privacy provision in constitution); Commonwealth v. 
Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369–70 (Mass. 2009); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 
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decision that rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge, for example, 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that law enforcement agents 
do not need probable cause to use a GPS-tracking device attached to 
the exterior of defendant’s work van over a period of nearly a 
month.102 
Among the courts that have suppressed such evidence, to 
contrast, most have relied on the “public exposure rationale” at the 
core of Justice Alito’s concurrence—that citizens have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their prolonged travels on public roads.103  
At least a couple of these courts have relied on their own state 
constitutional provisions to reach that conclusion.  Most notable 
among these is that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held in 2009, before Jones, that officers engage in a seizure within 
the meaning of the privacy provision of the state constitution when 
they attach and use a GPS surveillance device to track a defendant’s 
vehicle.104  That court focused on the government’s physical trespass 
of the vehicle.105  Since Jones, the Massachusetts high court has 
stretched its seizure ruling to hold that a passenger with no 
property interest in the vehicle also has a privacy interest in being 
free from police tracking of the vehicle.106  The court concluded that  
“a person may reasonably expect not to be subjected to extended 
GPS electronic surveillance by the government, targeted at his 
movements, without judicial oversight and a showing of probable 
cause.”107 
D. Contingency in the Doctrine 
We might assume that there is a significant point of contention 
between the Court’s approach in Jones and the one advocated by 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito.  According to the latter, the 
reasonableness analysis under Katz is contingent on the relative 
social integration of the surveillance technique at issue at the time 
the controversy arises.108  The late eighteenth century privacy-as-
property framing, the concurring Justices posited, is not up to 
analyzing the nontrespassory government surveillance of today.109 
Proponents of the trespass approach, on the other hand, assume 
that people have objective expectations of privacy in their property, 
and that this property-based expectation has remained constant 
 
494–99 (S.D. 2012) (applying the reasonable expectation test under the Fourth 
Amendment, relying on Sotomayor’s and Alito’s concurrences). 
 102. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 291 & n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) 
(distinguishing Maynard, 615 F.3d 544). 
 103. Holden, 54 A.3d at 1129. 
 104. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d at 369–70. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 990 N.E.2d 543, 553 (Mass. 2013). 
 107. Id. 
 108. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 960. 
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since the founding period.110  Expectations of privacy, Justice Scalia 
explained in Kyllo, do not “shrink” with every new advance in 
surveillance technology.111  The Constitution bars any collection of 
information that is otherwise undetectable without a physical 
intrusion.112  This rule keeps property as inviolable today as it was 
at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.  As self-conscious 
as the Justices have been about identifying themselves with either 
the reasonable expectation standard or the trespass rule, the 
distinction between the two approaches is not clear-cut.  In his 
opinion for the Court in Kyllo, for example, Justice Scalia asserted 
that the rule about “constitutionally protected area[s]” like the home 
does not apply to “sense-enhancing technolog[ies]” already in 
“general public use.”113  In other words, surveillance technologies 
survive constitutional scrutiny to the extent the public has adopted 
them. 
But, much more recently, in Jardines, Justice Scalia cursorily 
rejected the government’s citation to the “general public use” 
qualification in Kyllo, explaining that it was not applicable to the 
facts in Jardines.114  The government argued that “forensic dogs 
have been commonly used by police for centuries” and that their 
contemporary use is neither unreasonable nor unexpected.115  
Justice Scalia’s reply was brisk: “[T]he antiquity of the tools that” 
police officers use, he argued, “is irrelevant” to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis whenever “the government uses a physical 
intrusion to explore details of the home.”116 
The “general public use” exception in Kyllo, however, does far 
more analytical work than Justice Scalia acknowledged in Jardines.  
In Kyllo, it could do nothing other than qualify the general claim 
that the use of “sense-enhancing technolog[ies]” to obtain 
information about the inside of the home without a warrant is 
always constitutionally suspect; with this language, the Kyllo Court 
recognized that the scope of the core privacy right under the Fourth 
Amendment narrows to the extent users have adopted the 
investigatory technique at issue.117  In this way, the Fourth 
Amendment analysis under the trespass rule contemplates that 
users’ expectations evolve as the public adopts the surveillance 
technology at issue. 
Thus, even the trespass rule has substantial overlap with the 
Katz approach.  The Court asserted in Jardines, no less, that it 
 
 110. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 35. 
 114. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35. 
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applies to “constitutionally protected area[s]” where expectations of 
privacy are “heightened.”118  The trespass rule addresses only places 
in which people reasonably expect to be freest from government 
surveillance.119  Conversely, publicly exposed areas are presumably 
where expectations of privacy are at their lowest.  In this framing, 
the trespass rule occupies just one aspect of the doctrine.  This 
conclusion also aligns well with the series of cases involving police 
aerial surveillance of backyards.120  In these cases, the question for 
the Court has generally been whether the overhead flight at issue is 
sufficiently regular and socially expected.121  Some yards and fields 
are more protected than others, no matter the implications for 
private property ownership. 
That the two approaches overlap, however, does not mean that 
they are not addressed to two discrete kinds of privacy interests.  
The trespass rule concerns private property.  The Katz test, on the 
other hand, is addressed to intrusions of privacy more generally and 
is conditional by design. 
As they both accommodate the shifting contingencies of public 
expectation and adoption, however, neither really clarifies how 
judges ought to treat problems associated with emergent techniques, 
including the current controversies associated with total 
government surveillance.  Neither approach, to put the point 
differently, is particularly useful at answering whether the 
emergent surveillance techniques of today can ever go too far. 
To provide that Fourth Amendment protections against 
warrantless government searches are as permissive as users expect 
them to be is not a standard at all.  By pegging the test to 
expectation, the doctrine just recites a descriptive truism about 
adoption patterns and product lifecycles; firms design technologies 
in ways that are keyed to inchoate consumer expectation and 
consumers, in turn, adopt or reject those services depending on how 
relatively salient they are over time.122  As such, both expectation 
and trespass approaches are far too contingent to be useful as a 
matter of positive law.  The Fourth Amendment under this framing 
 
 118. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213 (1986)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989) (holding that 
police did not engage in a search of the defendant’s greenhouse from a 
helicopter above because the inside of the greenhouse could be seen from above 
through the partially open sides and roof of the greenhouse); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
at 215 (holding that the police did not engage in a search of the defendant’s 
yard from the aircraft above because “private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine”). 
 121. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 122. See generally GEORGE M. BEAL & JOE M. BOHLEN, IOWA STATE UNIV. SCI. 
& TECH., THE DIFFUSION PROCESS (1981) (discussing how farmers accept new 
ideas). 
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is not a particularly useful protection if its scope is premised on the 
public’s recognition that governments have the capacity to surveil 
their every move online.123 
E. Expectation and the Third-Party Doctrine: The Problem of Cell 
Phone Location Tracking 
A very recent line of cases in state and federal courts involving 
warrantless government surveillance of mobile phone location data 
illustrates the point.  This form of nontrespassory government 
surveillance, unlike the direct law enforcement searches at issue in 
Kyllo, Jones, and Jardines, depends on the cooperation of the service 
providers who supply noncontent communication about their 
subscribers’ phone usage. 
The current doctrine has no clear answer for whether total 
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment when third-party 
service providers collect and supply the information to law 
enforcement officials.124  The doctrine is inconclusive if, on the one 
hand, users are willing to give their information to service providers 
for the purposes of administering the underlying service but, on the 
other hand, polls suggest that users are wary about the amount of 
transactional data they volunteer to providers and that governments 
have access to that data.  As inconclusive as the current doctrine is, 
it is no surprise that courts have not been unanimous in their 
approach to cell phone location tracking. 
1. Cell Phone Location Tracking 
The growth of the market for wireless devices, gadgets, 
applications, and services over the past several years has been 
 
 123. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 25, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-
first-principles.pdf (“The chief difficulty with the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test is that it poses a question for which there is no good 
answer. . . .  [J]ust because a person knows that law enforcement agents have 
the technological capability to access electronic communications, that does not 
mean he would be unperturbed to find out that they actually accessed his.”). 
 124. This is far from the first essay or article to critique the doctrine.  See, 
e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151–64 (2007) (discussing an array 
of third-party issues, including subpoenas); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, 
Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored 
Transactional Data, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 211, 242–44 (2006) (critiquing how courts 
apply an “assumption of the risk” concept to the reasonable expectation of 
privacy framework); Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶¶ 8–9 (arguing that courts 
should move away from considering whether users actually know their 
communications are vulnerable and focus on the electronic surveillance method 
itself); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113–14 (2008) 
(contending that the “Stranger Principle” of collecting information from third 
parties threatens to completely undermine Fourth Amendment protections). 
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remarkable.125  And it does not appear to be slowing down.126  The 
vast majority of adults in the United States own a cell phone, and 
more than half own a smartphone.127  According to one report, 
mobile data traffic will increase anywhere from ten to twenty-five 
fold in the next five years.128  The growth rate of mobile Internet 
subscriptions is higher than that for wired subscriptions.129  It was 
estimated that by the end of 2013, mobile device connections on our 
planet would outnumber people.130 
All of these new connections will only increase the amount of 
data coursing through the networked information economy.  
Accordingly, service providers, device manufacturers, and 
application developers have designed smartphones and software 
that collect an array of transactional noncontent user data of which 
user location data are among the most notable. 
Service providers generally collect and analyze cell phone 
location data to ensure, among other things, that subscribers 
maintain network connection.131  But, as with the data that 
 
 125. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 156 
(2013), available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents 
/publications/mis2013/MIS2013_without_Annex_4.pdf; Claire Cain Miller, 
Mobile Apps Drive Rapid Change in Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at B1; 
Trend Data (Adults), PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT, http://fe01.pewinternet.org 
/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Device-Ownership.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014). 
 126. See, e.g., Ryan Knutson & Ben Fox Rubin, Verizon Reports Slowdown in 
Growth, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2013, at B4 (“Verizon Wireless added 927,000 
subscribers with contracts in the quarter.”); Esme Vos, Smart Meter 
Deployments to Double Market Revenue of Wireless Modules, MUNIWIRELESS 
(Oct. 16, 2013),  http://www.muniwireless.com/2013/10/16/smart-meter-
deployments-double-market-revenue/ (“An increase in smart meter deployments 
will see the global market for wireless communication modules approximately 
double in value over the coming years.”). 
 127. Trend Data (Adults), supra note 125. 
 128. OECD, MACHINE-TO-MACHINE COMMUNICATIONS: CONNECTING BILLIONS 
OF DEVICES 5 (2012), available at dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9gsh2gp043-en; see also 
David Talbot, The Spectrum Crunch that Wasn’t, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 26, 
2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/507486/the-spectrum-crunch-that 
-never-really-was/. 
 129. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 
30, 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases 
/Daily_Business/2013/db0520/DOC-321076A1.pdf. 
 130. Craig Timberg, Mobile Device Connections Growing Quickly, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology 
/mobile-device-connections-growing-quickly/2013/02/25/ca98ea98-7f51-11e2-
a350-49866afab584_story.html?wprss=rss_technology. 
 131. Indeed, all cellular phones are in constant contact with service-provider 
cell towers by design.  “Cell phones use radio waves to communicate between a 
user’s handset and a telephone network.  To connect with the local telephone 
network, the Internet, or other wireless networks, cell-phone providers 
maintain an extensive network of cell sites, or radio base stations, in the 
geographic areas they serve.”  State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 637 (N.J. 2013) 
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smartphone applications collect about users, subscriber location 
data have value over and above their role in keeping subscribers 
connected.  Location information can support an array of 
geographically-contingent consumer applications and services.  Any 
entity in possession of location data about users’ phones has that 
much more information that it can use to develop accurate user 
profiles. 
2. Third-Party Doctrine and Mobile Phone Tracking 
Law enforcement and national security officials in particular 
have a keen interest in the location of criminal suspects and their 
affiliates.132  Relatively recent reports indicate that police 
departments across the country have dramatically increased their 
requests to service providers to supply user location information.133  
Most law enforcement officials have made such requests without 
even bothering to obtain a warrant,134 and service providers have 
generally complied.135 
Subscribers, however, generally do not buy or use a phone 
service in order to be tracked by the government.  Most users in the 
United States apparently believe that information about their 
 
(citing In re U.S. Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Tex. 
2010)) (internal citations omitted). 
Whenever a cell phone is turned on, it searches for a signal and 
automatically registers or identifies itself with the nearest cell 
site—the one with the strongest signal.  The process is automatic.  
Cell phones re-scan every seven seconds, or whenever the signal 
strength weakens, even when no calls are made. 
Id. (citing In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005)) (internal citations omitted).  Most 
manufactures also make and sell smartphones with GPS tracking technologies.  
Jagdish Rebello, Four out of Five Cell Phones to Integrate GPS by End of 2011, 
IHS TECH. (July 16, 2010), https://technology.ihs.com/388892/four-out-of-five-
cell-phones-to-integrate-gps-by-end-of-2011. 
 132. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of 
U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 1; Savage, supra note 5. 
 133. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1. 
 134. See id. 
 135. No service provider has ever objected to complying with court orders for 
foreign communications, for example.  See In re Application of the F.B.I. for an 
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], NO. BR 13-
109, at 15–16 (FISA Ct. 2013), available at http://s3.documentcloud.org 
/documents/791759/br13-09-primary-order.pdf.  By its own account, the FISA 
Court has granted over 99% of NSA applications (some after court-ordered 
modification) for user data.  Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, 
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Charles E. Grassley, Ranking 
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/ranking-member-grassley-letter-
131011.pdf. 
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mobile phone usage ought to be private.136  Yet, service providers 
and governments have forged a public-private collaboration through 
which law enforcement officials obtain location information about 
user accounts. 
That this surveillance occurs in furtherance of law enforcement 
investigations removes it from the business purpose for user location 
tracking and into the higher stakes zone of state action that is 
subject to constitutional scrutiny.137  The courts have applied the 
third-party doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of public-private 
collaborations like these.  Under the doctrine, governments may rely 
on information that defendants knowingly volunteer to third-party 
witnesses to a communication.138  The courts have applied this 
general rule to cases in which law enforcement officials monitor the 
information that, for example, banks and telecommunications 
service providers obtain from customers in the ordinary course of 
business.139 
Smith v. Maryland, a case from 1979 involving telephone 
landlines, remains the defining statement by the Court on the third-
party doctrine as applied to telecommunications service providers.140  
There, defendant Smith had made harassing phone calls to a 
victim.141  Law enforcement officials confirmed that Smith was 
responsible for these calls after attaching a pen register to his home 
phone line.142  Smith sought to suppress the use of the phone record 
at trial.143  The Court rejected the motion, explaining that Smith did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone company’s 
record of the call since he knowingly gave that information to the 
company when he dialed the phone numbers.144  Tracking devices, 
the Court explained, are routinely used by service providers in order 
to check billing, detect fraud, block harassing calls, and prevent 
violations of law generally.145 
a.  Real-Time Location Data 
Courts have relied on this doctrine to determine whether law 
enforcement surveillance of real-time (or prospective) and historical 
 
 136. See JENNIFER M. URBAN ET AL., MOBILE PHONES AND PRIVACY 2 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405. 
 137. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
 138. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). 
 139. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438–40 (1976). 
 140. Smith, 442 U.S. 735. 
 141. Id. at 737. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 737–38. 
 144. Id. at 744 (discussing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–44 and holding that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records held in the ordinary 
course of business). 
 145. Id. at 742. 
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cell-site location data requires a showing of probable cause.146  As to 
the former, courts have disagreed about whether governments must 
make a showing of probable cause before obtaining the evidence.  In 
one line of cases, courts have cited Jones to distinguish between 
short-term and long-term tracking, which causes “foreseeable 
intrusion into protected areas.”147  That is, courts in this line of 
cases have determined that police may obtain real-time cell phone 
location information to the extent the police otherwise could have 
tracked the defendant in public places.148  In United States v. 
Skinner, for example, the Sixth Circuit panel distinguished Jones by 
observing that the three days of tracking at issue in the case before 
it did not last as long and was not as comprehensive.149  Along these 
lines, a district court in that jurisdiction cited Skinner approvingly 
(as it must) but found that a seven-month-long tracking of a 
defendant’s phone presented the same “concerns regarding extreme 
comprehensive tracking raised in Jones.”150 
These courts have assumed that defendants volunteer their 
phone location information when they procure and use the phone.151  
Discussing Smith, for example, a judge in the Eastern District of 
New York recently explained “that the voluntary disclosure doctrine 
provides the most important departure point in evaluating requests 
for prospective data.”152  It is not a defense that defendants do not 
control or know about the role of the third-party service provider.153  
“[I]t is clearly within the knowledge of cell phone users,” that court 
explained, “that their telecommunication carrier, smartphone 
manufacturer and others are aware of the location of their cell 
phone at any given time.”154  At least one other trial court in the 
district agrees.155 
 
 146. See United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013); 
In re Applications of U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code Section 
2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 n.4 (D. Mass. 2007). 
 147. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 780; see also United States v. Skinner, 690 
F.3d 772, 777–78 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 148. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777–78. 
 149. Id. at 779–80; see also United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 950–52 
(6th Cir. 2004), remanded on unrelated sentencing grounds sub. nom Garner v. 
United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005); United States v. Navas, 640 F. Supp. 2d 
256, 263–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 597 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 
2010); Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 300–01 (Ga. 2010). 
 150. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 774. 
 151. See, e.g., Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data 
Application, No. 13-MJ-242 GRB, 2013 WL 5583711, at 13 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2013). 
 152. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 2013 WL 5583711, at 
13. 
 153. Id. at 14. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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Some U.S. district courts, however, have pushed back against 
this reasoning, finding that defendants do not relinquish privacy in 
the real-time location simply by procuring a mobile phone.156  A 
district court in Vermont, for example, explained that defendants do 
not volunteer their phone location data during the ordinary course 
of business to third parties.157  Nor, it elaborated, do defendants 
“expect their cell phones to be pinged in the ordinary course of 
business.”158  Accordingly, law enforcement must make a showing of 
probable cause before obtaining real-time or prospective cell phone 
location information.159 
b.  Historical Location Data 
There is similar disagreement among the courts about how to 
treat historical cell phone location data.  The Fifth Circuit recently 
held, for example, that the Fourth Amendment does not require law 
enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before requesting 
subscribers’ historical phone location information.160  That panel 
explained that callers do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in data about when or where they talk on their mobile 
phones because, under the third-party doctrine, service providers 
have an instrumental business interest in recording subscribers’ 
transactions.161  Subscribers voluntarily disclose information about 
the call to service providers in order to make the connection.162  
According to the panel, law enforcement authorities may obtain this 
data from service providers without first making a showing of 
probable cause.163 
But again, courts are not unanimous.  District courts in New 
York and Texas, for example, have found that the Fourth 
Amendment requires the police to make a probable cause showing 
 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, No. 5:12-cr-105, 2013 WL 4039028, 
at 16–18 (D. Vt. Aug. 7, 2013); In re Application for Pen Register and 
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57 
(S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 157. Caraballo, 2013 WL 4039028, at 18. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.; see also United States v. Dooley, No. 1:11-CR-255-3-TWT, 2013 WL 
2548969, at 21–22 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2013). 
 160. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 
2013); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 
2012). 
 161. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 610 (citing 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) 
(applying third-party rule to records that a bank keeps in the regular course of 
business); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 162. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612. 
 163. Id. at 615. 
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before obtaining historical cell-site data.164  They have explained 
that the collection of months of cell phone location data could help 
render a “sufficiently detailed and intimate” profile of a suspect’s 
movements to trigger serious constitutional concerns.165 
Likewise, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court found that 
warrantless collection of historical cell phone data violates the 
privacy provision in the state constitution.  “[I]ndividuals,” the court 
explained, “do not lose their right to privacy [under the state 
constitution] simply because they have to give information to a 
third-party provider, like a phone company or bank, to get 
service.”166  Subscribers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
records that service providers collect to make the connection.167  
Mobile phone location data, the court explained, can be “far more 
revealing” than telephone records, bank records, or Internet 
subscriber information because they disclose “personal affairs, 
opinions, habits and associations.”168  This information provides new 
insight into where subscribers go, “the people and groups they 
choose to affiliate with and when they actually do so.”169  Wireless 
devices, as such, are little more than “24/7 surveillance” devices.170  
People do not reasonably anticipate that as much when they buy a 
cell phone.171  “Although individuals may be generally aware that 
their phones can be tracked,” the court explained, “most people do 
not realize the extent of modern tracking capabilities and 
 
 164. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical 
Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119–20, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (seeking long-
term, historical information); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 827, 837–40 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); In 
re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Application of the U.S. for 
& Order: (1) Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) 
Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing the 
Disclosure of Location–Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583–84 (W.D. Tex. 
2010); but see United States v. Pascual, 502 Fed. App’x 75, 80 & n.6 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 231 (2013) (suggesting that, in spite of district 
court decisions in the Second Circuit, defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone 
location data obtained without a showing of probable cause was probably 
consistent with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and Miller, 425 U.S. 
435). 
 165. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 119. 
 166. State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) (citing State v. 
Reid, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008)).  See generally N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 7, available 
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/lawsconstitution/constitution.asp. 
 167. Earls, 70 A.3d at 643; see also Reid, 945 A.2d at 34–35 (discussing 
Internet service subscriber information); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 874 
(N.J. 2005) (discussing bank records). 
 168. Earls, 70 A.3d at 642 (citing McAllister, 875 A.2d at 866). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring)). 
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reasonably do not expect law enforcement to convert their phones 
into precise, possibly continuous tracking tools.”172 
3. Technological Design 
We would do well by revisiting the particulars of the Smith 
opinion to gain insight on its applicability to contemporary mobile 
phone location tracking.  An important but arguably 
underappreciated feature of the opinion is the Court’s assumption 
about the way in which telephony works.  According to the Court, 
subscribers had long understood that phone carriers receive and 
transmit calls through service providers’ switching equipment.173  It 
was of no consequence as a constitutional matter, the Court 
explained, that service providers had automated this process; all 
parties to the call could reasonably expect that the phone company 
would be privy to the communication.174  Defendant Smith, the 
Court concluded, should have reasonably expected that he needed 
the phone company to complete the call.175  In this way, the Court’s 
holding reaffirmed the longstanding exception under the Fourth 
Amendment for third-party witnesses to a communication.176 
Many courts have nevertheless taken the analysis in Smith to 
stand for the broad principle that there is something about 
noncontent information per se that is entitled to less protection 
under the Fourth Amendment than the content of 
communications.177  To be sure, the Smith court recognized that the 
pen register collected noncontent information as opposed to 
communications content.178  But the mere fact that the data at issue 
were not the contents of the communication (i.e., the harassment) 
was not analytically significant; as shown above, the Court viewed 
 
 172. Id. at 643. 
 173. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 174. Id. at 744–45; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 
(1983) (automating the process of connecting a beeper service subscriber’s 
communication is not significant for the purposes of Fourth Amendment 
analysis); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 581, 600 (2011) (discussing the rationale the Court used in Smith, 442 U.S. 
735). 
 175. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 176. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.3(c) (5th ed. 
2009). 
 177. See id. (discussing competing interpretations of Smith, 442 U.S. 735).  
The Ninth Circuit elaborated on this point in a case involving text messages, 
holding that users of text messaging services have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the content of their texts but not the numbers to which they are 
sending those texts.  See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 
904 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario, Cal. v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 178. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741. 
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the sharing of noncontent data as an expected incident of how the 
phone company would complete his call.179 
Courts nevertheless rely on the broader reading of Smith—that 
probable cause showings are not required to track noncontent data 
as a matter of course—when they review government requests to 
obtain noncontent electronic communication data about subscribers 
from service providers.180  Federal courts have relied on this logic in 
order to grant such orders for less than probable cause in cases 
involving mobile phone records, as well as email addresses, the 
amount of data transmitted, IP addresses of websites visited, and 
other information about online user accounts.181  The assumption, 
attributed to Smith, is that such government requests are valid even 
without a warrant because the service provider is trading 
noncontent data. 
But there is no support for this broader reading of Smith.182  
The Court never asserted that the content-noncontent distinction 
was dispositive.  At a minimum, the opinion is far more complicated 
than the advocates of the distinction purport.  The decisive factor 
instead was how, according to the Court, subscribers expect the 
telephone technology to work.183  The service provider makes the 
connection possible, the Court noted, by receiving the call from the 
subscriber and in turn relaying it to the addressee.184  Subscribers 
accordingly do not have any expectations of privacy in the 
 
 179. Id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to 
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not 
have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.  
Regardless of his location, petitioner had to convey [his phone] number to the 
telephone company in precisely the same way if he wished to complete his 
call.”). 
 180. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 740–42 (2011). 
 181. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that computer surveillance techniques, which reveal email address, IP 
addresses, and other noncontent data, do not violate the 4th Amendament); In 
re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & 
Trap On [xxx]Internet Serv. Account/User Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. 
Supp. 2d 45, 49–50 (D. Mass. 2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining 
“pen register”); id. § 3127(4) (defining “trap and trace device”). 
 182. Cf. Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection 
for Stored E-mail, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 2008, at 121, 158–69; Patricia L. Bellia, 
Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1402–
03 (2004); Freiwald, supra note 180; Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable 
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1578 
(2004). 
 183. Cf. Smith, 442 U.S. at 442–43 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically 
know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that 
the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate 
business purposes.”). 
 184. Id. at 743–44. 
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transactional information about the communication because they 
volunteer that information to service providers.  Users demonstrably 
assume that the service provider is an inevitable and necessary 
participant in the communication when they consent to sharing 
their personal information over the telephone.185 
In any event, the broader reading of Smith is not useful in the 
era of total surveillance.186  To be sure, the distinction between 
content and noncontent is coherent; the former is likelier to disclose 
specific details about motivations and associations that could not 
necessarily be gleaned from the latter.  But, today, aggregated 
noncontent information about a user’s mobile phone account reveals 
information about actual habits and associations in ways that the 
content of any specific individual communication cannot.187  This 
deeply personal information is unrelated to the business purpose of 
providing the underlying telecommunications service.188  Under the 
broad reading of Smith, however, it could be traded, no matter how 
orthogonal the subsequent purpose is to telecommunications service. 
This is to say nothing, moreover, of the contemporary political 
economy of the infrastructure through which these communications 
pass.189  The local phone company is no longer the “vital” gate-
keeping communications monopoly it once was.190  Any node in the 
vast and complex telecommunications network is a potential link in 
the communication and, arguably, a site where noncontent data 
 
 185. At least one writer has noted that the decisive feature of the third-party 
doctrine as stated in Miller is the “automation rationale” on which the Court 
relied.  See Tokson, supra note 174, at 599–600.  The Court assumed that the 
transition from human observation to automation of the telephone switch was 
not constitutionally significant.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“This analysis dictates 
that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy here.  When he 
used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the 
telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the 
ordinary course of business.  In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the 
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.  The switching 
equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of 
the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the 
subscriber.”).  But now that humans do not play any real part in observing or 
relaying the communication to addressees, users understandably do not have an 
expectation that they have waived their right to privacy in the call.  Tokson, 
supra note 174, at 611–12. 
 186. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 187. Cf. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–200 (N.Y. 2009) 
(discussing the data one could obtain through a GPS device). 
 188. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy 
is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.  Those who 
disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose 
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for 
other purposes.”). 
 189. Cf. Solove, supra note 64, at 753. 
 190. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
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about the connection may be collected.191  But such reasoning simply 
does not make any sense if privacy is to have any constitutional or 
positive legal meaning.  Under the broad reading of Smith, 
individual users’ mobile devices could always be under government 
surveillance from any point in the network because that is how the 
technology works.192 
III.  TOWARDS A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY STANDARD 
A. Judicial Discovery of Expectation 
It is axiomatic in the United States that courts have an 
affirmative duty “to say what the law is.”193  The Framers crafted 
the Bill of Rights generally and the Fourth Amendment in 
particular to be an antimajoritarian check against overly intrusive 
state action.194  They ostensibly did not trust law enforcement 
officials or elected representatives to regulate themselves.195  Courts 
were to be the ultimate arbiters of whether legislative or executive 
action pass constitutional muster. 
Accordingly, federal courts have no choice but to be fully 
engaged in assessing the legality of the newest technologies and 
engage in a normative inquiry about whether surveillance has gone 
too far.196  And, indeed, from time to time, they have, designing and 
recalibrating federal law to accommodate emergent Internet-based 
technologies.  We see this commonly in the substantive areas of 
intellectual property and telecommunications.197  To be sure, in 
 
 191. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a 
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
805, 813–14 (2003). 
 192. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Fisa Court Order that Allowed NSA 
Surveillance Is Revealed for First Time, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/19/court-order-that-allowed-nsa-
surveillance-is-revealed-for-first-time. 
 193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
 194. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
 195. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1904–
05 (2013) (arguing that when legislatures balance privacy “against the cutting-
edge imperatives of national security, efficiency, and entrepreneurship, privacy 
comes up the loser”); see also COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE 
GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 13–18 
(2003); see generally PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, 
SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995) (discussing the public perception of 
privacy in American society). 
 196. See generally Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶ 9 (discussing courts’ positive 
duty to engage in a “normative inquiry” into the scope of privacy protection). 
 197. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.  Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 
913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000–02 (2005) (granting Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), deference to 
agency decision that broadband service is not “telecommunications service” 
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those areas, courts defer as matter of administrative law doctrine to 
the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority to interpret 
and implement the pertinent federal statutes (e.g., the 
Communications Act and the Copyright Act).198  But courts also take 
seriously their responsibility to interpret or reject statutes and 
agency actions when they run afoul of either constitutional 
principles or basic requirements under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.199 
There is no reason to believe that the newest surveillance 
technologies should be treated any differently.200  The Katz and 
Smith opinions themselves are vivid illustrations of this, as 
unwieldy as the standards they propounded have become over time.  
In both, the Court provided—at the time of their respective 
announcements—useful blueprints for federal law on 
nontrespassory government surveillance for three to four decades.201 
The Jones majority, however, was not so taken by its duty to say 
what privacy law is in the era of total surveillance.  It was reluctant 
to revise the current doctrine based on the limited facts before it.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion relied instead on a far more limited 
eighteenth century property-based aspect of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine that he, above anyone else, has been elaborating on his 
opinions for the past thirteen or so years.202  Even in his 
concurrence, Justice Alito, too, threw his hands up, explaining that 
legislatures are far better at discerning expectations in the context 
of new technologies than courts are.203 
Reticence is sometimes prudent.  Article III courts generally 
lack the institutional capacity to resolve the polycentric scope of 
problems posed by new technologies.204  They do not routinely 
 
under the amended Communications Act); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 
521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down on First Amendment grounds the 
obscenity provisions in the Communications Decency Act that extant 
technologies provide “less restrictive alternatives”); WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 
F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the “transmit clause” of the Copyright Act 
does not forbid subscribers from watching or recording retransmitted video 
streams of broadcast programming on a website without the broadcasters’ 
permission). 
 198. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the Copyright Office’s decision pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944)) deference); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 
U.S. at 1001–02. 
 199. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) 
(holding that there is no basis in the APA to subject changes in agency policy to 
more searching review); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635–36 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 200. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404–05 (2013). 
 201. See e.g., Freiwald, supra note 180, at 732–33. 
 202. United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945, 949 (2012). 
 203. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 204. See Kerr, supra note 17, at 805–06; see also Stephanie K. Pell & 
Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards 
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receive all of the evidence regarding public opinion or public 
adoption of contemporary surveillance techniques.  Courts may 
receive extralegal empirical evidence from interested parties about 
how the public perceives emergent surveillance techniques.  They 
may also request sua sponte that information in briefing by the 
parties.  They may even take judicial notice of it, without much if 
any elaboration.205 
But, again, there is no articulated process or positive 
requirement in the Fourth Amendment to discover public 
expectation as a matter of course.  This is quite unlike other 
constitutional areas for which the Court has developed measures to 
gauge public opinion.  Consider the Court’s standard under the 
Eighth Amendment for reviewing the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.206  There, it has employed an “evolving standards of 
decency” test that relies on, among other things, trends in state 
legislatures across the country.207 
The public expectation standard under the Fourth Amendment 
has no such hook.  It is a relatively indeterminate concept that turns 
on the reviewing judges’ intuitions about what is or is not a 
reasonable public expectation.  As such, it looks much more like a 
wide-ranging, fact-finding expedition far better suited to legislative 
discovery and deliberation.208 
B. Discovering Expectation Through Public Lawmaking  
The legislative process in the United States is designed to 
discover and articulate public priorities.209  Legislatures and 
agencies generally promulgate and elaborate area-specific privacy 
 
for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 150 (2012); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, 
Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming spring 2014), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384174 (discussing the 
need for Big Data Ethics in today’s digital society).  But see Solove, supra note 
64. 
 205. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Because there is reason to believe that there is considerable public 
use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced 
no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley’s 
expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation 
from that altitude was not a reasonable one.”); United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 
F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (taking judicial notice of geography through 
Google Maps). 
 206. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–63 (2005) (noting that, since 
the “cruel and unusual punishment” standard under the Eighth Amendment 
depends on “evolving standards of decency,” the Court refers to the consensus 
among state legislatures and global national trends); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002). 
 207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61. 
 208. Cf. Riley, 488 U.S. at 462–65 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 209. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
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laws by generally attending to a wider range of economic, social, and 
political factors than the other branches can.210   
This is true in the context of privacy law in particular, where 
legislatures work “to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw 
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a 
comprehensive way.”211  Consider, again, that the Jones majority 
and concurring Justices invited Congress to define privacy in the 
context of GPS tracking, even as they wrestled with the 
constitutionality of the police’s warrantless use of that technique.212 
This is an especially important point as it relates to the 
reasonable expectation standard today.  Since 1968, federal statutes 
have directed courts’ analysis of electronic surveillance by law 
enforcement.213  Indeed, Congress and federal agencies articulate 
privacy expectations through statutes and regulations that are 
addressed to specific governmental purposes.  In regard to law 
enforcement surveillance, for example, Congress has amended or 
clarified the scope of privacy protections as new technologies and 
techniques have emerged.  Consider the Wiretap Act and the 
Electronic Communications Protection Act (“ECPA”).214  Congress 
passed the first in 1968, just a year after the Court announced its 
decision in United States v. Berger and Katz.215  The new law 
incorporated the Court’s approach to nontrespassory government 
searches of telephone calls, imposing judicial review at all stages of 
a targeted police investigation.216  It required, for example, 
prosecutors to identify with particularity the sought-after evidence, 
alleged offenses, duration of the surveillance, and applicable laws in 
order to obtain a court order to intercept or obtain the contents of a 
 
 210. Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 
(1915). 
 211. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 212. See, e.g., id. at 962 (“[C]oncern about new intrusions on privacy may 
spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.”); id. at 
964 (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best 
solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”).  There are some similarities 
between Alito’s statement here and Justice Scalia’s notable concurring opinion 
in a patent case decided during the same term, in which he disavowed any 
portion of the Court’s opinion that recited the “fine details of molecular biology” 
because he could not “affirm those details on [his] own knowledge or even [his] 
own belief.”  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 213. Before the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
(Wiretap Act) tit. III, 18 U.S.C. §§25102522 (2012), section 605 of the 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012) was the chief protection against 
the interception and sharing of content and noncontent information about users’ 
communications.  Id.  That provision, however, was rarely enforced as a matter 
of federal law enforcement policy.  See Freiwald, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 214. See Freiwald, supra note 3, at 24–32 (discussing the provenance and 
congressional enactment of the Wiretap Act). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 15–17, 24–32. 
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suspect’s electronic communications.217  Prosecutors were also to 
demonstrate to the reviewing judge that “there is probable cause” to 
believe that the interception will uncover communications about the 
alleged offense.218 
The Wiretap Act, however, did not anticipate the problems 
unique to computing, data storage, and electronic communications 
that would arise in the following decade.219  Congress accordingly 
amended the Wiretap Act to address user privacy protections in 
1986 through Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”).220  The strongest protections in the new law were reserved 
for the content of electronic communications, including e-mails.221  
The statute imposed the same procedural hurdles for the content of 
email that existed for telephony, with the exception of the 
suppression remedy.222 
In the SCA, Congress also made it easier for the government to 
obtain noncontent subscriber data.223  The statute established, for 
example, a mechanism through which parties, including the 
government, could obtain noncontent data held by service providers 
about a subscriber’s electronic communications.224  Law enforcement 
officials may obtain a court order directed at service providers for 
information about subscribers as long as they can identify “specific 
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the contents” or records of an electronic communication 
 
 217. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2012). 
 218. Id. § 2518(3)(b). 
 219. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3 
(1985), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99-
508/fgit-1985.pdf.  See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 176, § 4.3(b). 
 220. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 
Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712).  See generally 
Freiwald, supra note 3, at 47–50 (discussing the provenance and congressional 
enactment of the ECPA). 
 221. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703.  The statute elaborated on the distinction 
between the surveillance of content and noncontent data, but, rather than refer 
to “content” and “noncontent data,” the ECPA speaks of “stored wire and 
electronic communications and transactional records.”  Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, ch. 121 (title). 
 222. See United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 949–50 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. 
granted, vacated sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).  
Notably, these protections do not apply to “stored” emails—that is, emails that 
have been opened and are no longer in transit.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(B)(i); 
see also United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009); 
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2004).  But see Theofel v. 
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 223. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 224. Id. §§ 2701, 2702(c). 
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“are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”225  
This is a lower standard than the probable cause required for a 
search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.226 
In 1994, Congress expanded privacy protections for some forms 
of noncontent electronic data.227  But, in 2001, within months of the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
Congress passed the Patriot Act to broaden the range of noncontent 
data to which the “pen register” provisions in the SCA apply.228  
These provisions have been reauthorized at least three times since 
2001.229 
As complex as this scheme is, the Wiretap Act and ECPA 
represent just a fraction of federal statutory law on electronic 
surveillance of communications.  Under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and FISA Amendments Act, for example, 
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) reportedly monitors any 
suspects “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S. borders at the 
time.230  Congress also has taken the lead in defining the terms of 
 
 225. Id. § 2703(d); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th 
Cir. 2010). 
 226. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 291 (“Under § 2703(d), such an order shall issue 
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 227. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012)). 
 228. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123, 3127(3); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). 
 229. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 1801). 
 230. First Amendments Act of 2008 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).  The agency 
does this by using keywords to search existing data stores of online activity.  
The NSA, however, has yet to publicize the names or numbers of U.S. citizens 
whose domestic communications have been monitored deliberately or 
inadvertently.  The agency has acknowledged, however, that U.S. citizens’ 
communications with foreigners are, and will continue to be, inadvertently 
swept into their online dragnets, particularly as the United States is the 
principal hub through which much of the world’s Internet communications flow.  
See NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST (July 
10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-
collection-documents/.  James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, 
has assured that the NSA employs “extensive procedures” to “minimize the 
acquisition, retention and dissemination of incidentally acquired information 
about U.S. persons.”  William Saletan, The Government’s Cybersurveillance 
Program Targets Foreigners, Not Americans. But Can It Tell the Difference?, 
SLATE (June 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/
06/prism_and_u_s_citizens_does_the_government_s_cyber_surveillance_progra
m.html.  Since widespread reporting of this practice, the Obama administration 
has sought to assure that the proper checks are in place to regulate unduly 
invasive tracking practices.  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which 
is responsible for oversight of NSA surveillance activity under the FISA, 
recently explained that it approves over 99% of applications for surveillance, a 
quarter of which are approved after court-ordered modification.  See Larry 
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what is or is not private across legislative fields outside of electronic 
surveillance by law enforcement, albeit very unevenly.231  Congress 
and the federal agencies responsible for implementing law have 
defined informed consent, opt-out, transparency, and confidentiality 
requirements in a wide array of legislative fields, including credit 
reporting,232 health records,233 and videotape rental information.234 
Evidently, the public-lawmaking bodies have been attending to 
privacy protection for at least four decades, amending statutes along 
the way in order to account for emergent technologies and prevailing 
political preoccupations.  This trend continues today.  Congress, 
state legislatures, and federal agencies are considering a range of 
new privacy-related limits, for example, on online revenge posts235 
and online gun purchases,236 as well as on trading among 
commercial data brokers and Internet companies of online user 
information.237  Among the latter in particular are transparency 
 
Abramson, FISA Court: We Approve 99 Percent of Wiretap Applications, NPR 
(Oct. 15, 2013, 3:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2013/10/15/234840282/fisa-court-we-approve-99-percent-of-wiretap-
applications?ft=1&f=1001.  Recent news reports also suggest that other national 
security agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have paid service 
providers for call data.  See Savage, supra note 5. 
 231. See Chris Hoofnagle, United States of America, in COMPARATIVE STUDY 
ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE 
LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639161 (“A panoply of 
statutes now regulates specific types of government and business practices, 
with no broadly-applicable privacy statute governing data collection, use, or 
disclosure.”). 
 232. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 233. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104–191, § 701, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181). 
 234. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (2012). 
 235. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Once Scorned, but on Revenge Sites, Twice Hurt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, at A11; California Enacts, New York to Propose 
Criminal Laws Tackling “Revenge Porn,” CRIM. DEF. NETWORK (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.criminal-defense-network.com/privacy-california-enacts-new-york-
propose-criminal-laws-tackling-revenge-porn/. 
 236. Jonathan Weisman & Jennifer Steinhauser, Critical Week in Senate for 
Gun and Immigration Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2013/04/09/us/politics/congress-returns-with-focus-on-guns-and-immigration-
legislation.html.  Of course, that policymakers are involved in defining privacy 
in or outside of the context of emergent technologies is not to say that they 
always do a good job.  Public lawmaking is rife with dubious invasions of 
privacy on minorities. 
 237. See Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, at A3; Natasha Singer, Citing Deep Data Collections, 
Senator Opens Inquiry of Information Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at B3; 
Marc S. Roth & Charles Washburn, Data Brokers Face Blurring Lines, 
Increased Regulatory Risks, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com 
/practitioner-contributions/data-brokers-face-blurring-lines/ (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN 
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 
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rules that would require companies to make their data sharing 
policies public and also to provide to users all of the information that 
those companies hold about them.238 
C. Towards a New Judicial Standard 
Mindful of the trend towards codification, judges have eagerly 
invited Congress to elaborate substantive protections by statute.239  
They presume that legislatures are far better at discovering and 
articulating public expectations than they are.240  To be sure, 
statutes also have holes that courts from time to time have filled.241  
But today, for the most part, judges and some scholars believe that 
legislatures are at least as good, if not better, at adapting broad 
privacy protections to emergent technologies.242 
This does not mean, however, that courts do not have a central 
role to play in defining the scope of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.243  To the contrary, to remove them from the 
governance of privacy law is to work against a foundational feature 
of our constitutional system.  At a minimum, courts are 
constitutionally essential to adjudicating whether law enforcement 
officials in specific cases have made a sufficient probable cause 
showing to justify a search.244  Courts have long weighed in on a 
wide range of fact-specific privacy problems associated with 
emergent technologies.245 
But my argument here is not that courts should define all of 
privacy law.  All branches have an important institutional role to 
play, as all of them have distinctive competencies to contribute.246  
 
11–12 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-
rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 238. Singer, supra note 237. 
 239. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 240. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (concluding that 
because a helicopter that spotted his marijuana plant was flying at a legally 
permissible level, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 241. Solove, supra note 64, at 761–65. 
 242. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 17, at 805; see also Richards, supra note 6, at 
1958 (agreeing with Kerr that “federal statutory law has advantages over the 
Fourth Amendment in guarding against surveillance in the digital age”). 
 243. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); see generally 
Solove, supra note 64, at 749. 
 244. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 245. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
beeper placed in a container that was transported to the owner’s cabin); United 
States v. Ahrndt, 475 F. App’x 656, 658 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Limewire files stored on a 
wireless network). 
 246. Kerr, supra note 17, at 806; Solove, supra note 64, at 774. 
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To be sure, legislatures have been working hard to define privacy 
rights since the late 1960s.247  But this activity does not prove that 
the legislature ought to hold forth above all branches on elaborating 
the positive legal meaning of privacy.  The relative legitimacy of any 
public law requires the active, coequal participation of courts as well 
as the Chief Executive.248 
But this aspiration has apparently not caught on in fact.  In the 
area of networked communications in particular, courts have 
expressed concerns about propounding general binding legal rules 
prematurely.  In the area of privacy law, courts fear that they are 
deciding issues without the benefit of knowing whether (let alone 
how to determine) the public has adopted the technology at issue.249  
Even the Jones court was eager to receive guidance from 
Congress.250  As I explain above, the majority there failed to give 
any real guidance on the Fourth Amendment implications of smart 
phone GPS tracking or cell phone location tracking.251 
That judges today eagerly request legislative guidance on the 
scope of privacy protection in cases involving emergent electronic 
communication technologies seems to be a consequence of the way in 
which the Supreme Court since Katz has framed the governing 
doctrine.  The reasonable expectation standard today is wholly 
contingent on shifting public perceptions and anxieties.  As such, it 
is ineffective at defining clear lines for all circumstances ex ante.  It 
is especially ineffectual today, when users are demonstrably inured 
to the inevitable fact that their personal data can and will be traded 
among commercial service providers and government agencies.252  In 
 
 247. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 64, at 754. 
 248. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1061, 1066 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive 
Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 
664 (2000); see also S. 914, 2011  Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110701 
_amended_asm_v96.pdf (proposing to amend Cal. Pen. Code 1542.5 in order to 
overturn People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), which held that search of the 
defendant’s cell phone as an incident of his arrest does not violate Fourth 
Amendment)).  This bill was vetoed by Governor Brown, who stated, 
“The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues 
relating to constitutional search-and-seizures protections.”  Letter from 
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to Members of the Cal. State Senate 
(Oct. 9, 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-
0950/sb_914_vt_20111009.html. 
 249. See, e.g., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) 
(“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become 
clear.”). 
 250. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 251. See discussion supra Subpart II.E. 
 252. Susan Freiwald & Sylvain Métille, Reforming Surveillance Law: The 
Swiss Model, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1261, 1278 (2013) (“[L]aw enforcement 
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this way, the judicial quest to discover the public’s expectation of 
privacy in any given case could prove inconclusive. 
This is why the current reasonable expectation standard is not 
enough.  This is to say that the constitutional defense should not 
turn alone on the extent of public adoption or use of the surveillance 
technique at issue.  Privacy would altogether lose any positive legal 
meaning if judicial intuitions, polls, or adoption rates were to be its 
measure.253  In this vein, courts are in urgent need of a new 
standard that empowers them to say what the law is in the first 
instance, even and especially when it might contravene adoption 
rates or popular expectations.  To let the standard stand “as is” 
would effectively undercut the very idea that privacy is a domain of 
life that is not contingent on public opinion. 
At least two reforms could cure the doctrine’s current failings.  
The first we find in the Jones concurrences.  There, Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito offered a useful elaboration of the expectations 
standard that would take long-term location monitoring in 
particular into account.254  They would ask “whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”255  In this way, the concurring Justices appear to 
recognize that the Fourth Amendment should not merely protect 
discrete instances of state overreach but also those occasions where 
the aggregation of isolated bits of noncontent personal information 
could constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Five members of the current Court are inclined to agree with 
this view.256  So it would not be surprising if the Court adopted the 
view in some future case.  And, assuming it does adopt this “mosaic 
theory,” such a reform would not necessarily represent a 
transformative shift in the doctrine.  Under the approach developed 
by Justices Sotomayor and Alito, public expectations would remain 
determinative; their view is that there is a point at which certain 
kinds of data aggregation or prolonged surveillance exceed 
expectations, and that is the point at which they would draw the 
line. 
 
agents in the United States conduct surveillance until a statute or a court 
decision restricts them from doing so.”). 
 253. In some regards, this indeterminacy is among the main concerns that 
animate Justice Scalia’s ambition for more formal stability in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
 254. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 255. Id.; see also id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 256. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
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But, as with the expectation standard today generally, such an 
approach is completely contingent and hard to predict as new 
technologies emerge.  The scope of privacy should not be determined 
by contemporaneous public expectations.  Such a formulation 
defeats the purpose of privacy itself.  And as long as public 
expectation remains the test, courts and users will continue to let 
their bemusement and adoption of the newest technologies guide 
constitutional law.  The expectation analysis allows those 
intermittent moments of complacence, after the technology 
eventually enters “general public use,” to shrink privacy for future 
generations gradually over time to the point where it would not 
resemble anything we know it to be today. 
An alternative approach would accordingly decouple public 
expectation from the privacy analysis altogether.  It could assert 
simply that long periods of surveillance and powerful algorithms for 
data aggregation pose a Fourth Amendment threat to the extent the 
information is analyzed by law enforcement officials.257  Under this 
approach, courts would attend to the way in which officials use the 
information, notwithstanding user expectations about officials’ 
capacity to obtain and analyze it.  In this formulation, as Justice 
Sotomayor explained in her concurring opinion in Jones, the third-
party doctrine would cease “to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for 
privacy.”258  This reform would address head-on the fictional 
assumption that users have constructively consented to or assumed 
the risk of surveillance.259  It is this assumption that invites the 
rampant trading of personal user data between service providers 
and governments.  At the same time, this approach would allow that 
discrete disclosures to service providers for narrow business 
purposes are necessary for the delivery of new and emergent 
communication technologies. 
Courts accordingly would bring a needed dose of reality to 
Fourth Amendment analysis by excising any broad assumptions 
about the nature of user consent in the third-party doctrine.  This 
reform would recognize that users do not generally choose to 
compromise their data about their phone use (or web browsing or e-
mailing) just because they disclose information for the limited 
purpose of obtaining telecommunications service.  Participation in 
the networked information economy is practically a necessity today.  
 
 257. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 (2013). 
 258. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Freiwald, 
supra note 180, at 746–48; Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶¶ 58–75 (discussing a 
four factor test that would inquire into whether the surveillance was hidden, 
intrusive, indiscriminate, and continuous). 
 259. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the 
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1204 
(2009) (explaining that knowledge of risk does not equate to assumption of risk); 
Freiwald, supra note 123, ¶ 42. 
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Total surveillance seems to be a highly disproportionate toll to pay 
for inclusion, no matter what users’ expectations are. 
CONCLUSION 
The reasonable expectation standard and the third-party 
doctrine have outlived their time and usefulness.  Reform is 
especially urgent today, in the era of total surveillance, when data 
brokers and governments can aggregate and trade transactional 
subscriber data about electronic communications so easily.  
Expectations are difficult to define when everyone, it seems, shares 
their personal information with service providers and application 
developers in order to be connected. 
Indeed, Fourth Amendment doctrine today has nothing to offer 
in the way of privacy protection when even courts are uncertain 
about how to define public expectation as a descriptive matter.  
Their doubt understandably compels them to defer to legislatures to 
discover what expectation ought to be as a matter of law. 
As contingent as the current standard is, courts are right to 
defer to legislatures.  But the doctrine is flawed if it has the effect of 
encouraging judges to seek guidance from legislatures on 
constitutional norms.  Judicial review is the vital antimajoritarian 
check against excessive government intrusions on individual liberty 
under our constitutional scheme.  Courts should therefore not pass 
off their duty to define privacy to the political branches.  They must 
reform privacy law doctrine accordingly if the protection against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” is to have any positive legal 
meaning in the era of total surveillance. 
 
 
